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HOW DID WE GET HERE AND
WHERE ARE WE GOING? 
FRED R. KAEN*
The Roots: Modern Financial Theory
M
odern financial theory emerged in the late
1950s and early 1960s to provide a scientific
basis for explaining corporate investment, financing
and dividend decisions. I emphasize the word scien-
tific because many academics believed the financial
decision-making rules of practitioners were riddled
with inconsistencies and made no logical sense.
For example, a typical story about why firms
should use debt financing was that the stock price
of the firm would be unaffected because investors
wouldn’t notice or care as long as not too much
debt was used and, as a result, the overall cost of
financing the company would fall. No “scientific”
theory existed as to why this would happen, or for
that matter, why and how any financing decision,
including the decision to pay cash dividends,would
affect the company’s market value and stock price.
Lurking in the background of pre-modern finance
was also the idea that the earnings a corporation
retained and reinvested in the company were cost-
less.And as this source of equity capital was costless,
managers did not have to worry about how they
invested these earnings or whether they earned an
adequate return on this capital. This attitude about
retained earnings is duly noted in Adolph Berle’s
preface to the 1967 re-issue of his classic work (Berle
and Means 1967), where Berle writes:
“The purchaser of stock does not contribute
savings to an enterprise, thus enabling it to
increase its plant operations. He does not take
the “risk”on a new or increased economic oper-
ation;he merely estimates the chance of the cor-
poration’s shares increasing in value.The contri-
bution his purchase makes to anyone other than
himself is the maintenance of liquidity for other
shareholders who may wish to convert their
holdings into cash. Clearly, he cannot and does
not intend to contribute managerial or entre-
preneurial effort or service.”
And then came the revolution of modern finance
theory. It began with Harry Markowitz giving us
portfolio theory and formalizing what the English
merchants already knew in the 17th century –
don’t send all your cargo in one ship (Markowitz
1959). Benoit Mandelbrot (1966) and Eugene
Fama (1970) gave us market efficiency – don’t
look for twenty-dollar bills on the floor; but if you
find one, pick it up quickly before it’s gone.
Modigliani and Miller (1959) told us that in per-
fect capital markets financing and dividend deci-
sions didn’t matter – at least for the shareholders
– so don’t waste time with worrying about whether
and how much debt to use. And, William Sharpe
(1964) and others introduced us to beta and the
capital asset pricing model.
Fundamentally,these founders of modern financial
theory were concerned with a very important pub-
lic policy as well as scientific question:What deter-
mines the market value of a company and, in par-
ticular, the per share stock price in efficient mar-
kets? The answer was: the greater the cash flows
and the lower the risk, the more the company is
worth. In other words, these “scientists” produced
“scientific” models that showed a manager how to
maximize the company’s market value and share
price. As to whether managers should and would
make decisions to maximize share price was anoth-
er matter. And, here is where corporate gover-
nance reemerged from historical debates about the
modern corporation and how it should be con-
trolled and managed.
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COM).The Corporate Governance Debate
Especially in the United States, the debate was
about how to ensure that managers of publicly
owned corporations would manage the firm in the
best interests of society rather than in their own
personal interests or the interests of political oli-
garchy.A number of proposals were advanced; but
the one that concerns us here is that which says the
best way to make sure managers use resources effi-
ciently is to have them maximize shareholder value
and return any cash that cannot be profitably
invested to the shareholders. This is the “should”
part.
A good way to get a handle on the “should” part
and how it has influenced the corporate gover-
nance debate in the post-“modern finance” era is
to go back to the early 1980s and recall the often
emotional debates about the demise of American
corporations and the superiority of the German
and especially Japanese corporate governance sys-
tems.
In a classic article, Hayes and Abernathy (1980)
were confident that America was in decline and
they knew why. It was the short-term myopic
behavior of managers who focused on quarterly
earnings, ROI (return on investment) and other
accounting performance measures that supposedly
led to a reduction in R&D expenditures and the
development of new technologies. And who was
responsible for this? Well, supposedly it was short-
term myopic stockholders who demanded high
ROIs and quarterly increases in earnings per share
at the expense of long-term growth – in other
words, financial markets.
According to these and other critics, the problem
with the American economy was a capital-market-
based corporate governance system with public
shareholders and institutional investors forcing
management to make decisions not in the best
interests of the economy as a whole.And,what was
the solution? Imitate the Germans and the
Japanese (Porter 1992).
What was the “scientific” evidence behind these
condemnations of markets and institutional
investors? Not much! In fact, the evidence that
began emerging from academic studies done by
financial economists suggested just the opposite.
Woolridge’s study of market reactions to corporate
investment decisions is typical of the accumulated
evidence (Woolridge 1988). He found that compa-
ny stock prices actually went up (not down) when
companies announced increases in research and
development expenditures, new product introduc-
tions and capital expenditures for capacity expan-
sion and plant modernization.
What was going on here? Maybe the problem was
not the investors but rather the managers and
other organizational stakeholders who, like every-
one else, acted in their own self-interest. Now we
are back to the question: How do we get managers
to make economically efficient investments and
distribute any remaining cash to the shareholders
rather than keep it for themselves? How do the
suppliers of capital make sure they get back their
investment as well as a return on their money? 
Here is where corporate governance comes into its
own.1 What we want are ways to align the interests
of managers with those of the shareholders, to
ensure that managers and boards of directors rep-
resent the interests of the public shareholder or
their representatives – the pension funds and
mutual funds – and make it possible for sharehold-
ers to monitor and replace management and direc-
tors who attempt to extract wealth from the public
shareholders.
Monitoring and Controlling Managers 
One of the most popular answers in the 1990s for
controlling managers and aligning their interests
with the shareholders was pay for performance.
But, how do you measure performance? 
If we go back to the critique of Abernathy and
Hayes about manager myopia, we find that they
focused almost exclusively on ROI as the measure
that was causing short-termism. This outcome
occurred because ROI, like other financial state-
ment measures such as net income and earnings
per share, are backward looking accounting mea-
sures easily subject to the manipulation of man-
agers.Instead,why not measure managerial perfor-
mance and compensate managers using stock
prices – the very thing shareholders wanted man-




vs. the U.S. model
of corporate
governance
1 The “should” part remains controversial and lies at the heart of
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agement to maximize. Or, alternatively, award
stock based on stock price performance.As long as
you believe financial markets are efficient and
investors are not myopic, stock options and stock
ownership are reasonable means for aligning man-
agerial interests with public shareholders. But for
investors to properly price out the stock, they need
dependable, trustworthy and transparent financial
statements. No “cooked books”, thank you!
Other useful ways for controlling managers from a
disciplinary perspective have to do with the com-
pany’s financing and dividend policies. In doing so,
however, we transform the financing and dividend
decision from one focused solely on identifying
that capital structure which minimizes the compa-
ny’s cost of capital to a governance question of
how investors control managers and prevent them
from making unprofitable investments.
The best way to grasp this shift is to look at the
data in the exhibit below.When we arrange a vari-
ety of investment and financing events according
to whether they generate cash flows from the firm
to investors or from investors to the firm, we find
the former all have positive returns and the latter
all negative returns.Why?
Michael Jensen’s answer is the free cash flow theo-
ry of corporate finance (Jensen 1986). Investors
like to get cash from companies and do not like to
leave cash lying around for managers to spend on
other things unless, and this is the big unless, they
can invest these funds in growth opportunities. But
how do you keep managers from squandering
shareholder funds? You finance the company with
debt instead of equity, because debt requires peri-
odic outflows of cash from the company in the
form of interest and principal payments. You also
pay cash dividends or buy back your stock – the
same thing as a cash dividend payment.
Of course, not all companies pay cash dividends
and not all companies have debt in their capital
structure. Does this mean something is wrong with
the free cash flow story? Not really. For companies
with substantial growth opportunities you want
managers to have wide discretion over the cash
flows so as to be able to take advantage of these
opportunities.You also don’t want to burden them
with debt financing and the restrictions normally
associated with bank loans. Thus, these are the
firms who should not pay cash dividends and avoid
debt.
Now we have a story about why managers should
maximize shareholder value and a governance
story about how managerial compensation
schemes and financing and dividend decisions can
be used to align the interests of managers with
those of shareholders and control managerial
behavior.What we are missing is a story about why
managers would do any of this or why
boards and directors would be
responsive to shareholder instead of
management concerns. The question
is: Suppose public investors don’t like
what the boards and management are
doing with their money.What can they
do about it? The answer is a market
for corporate control, a legal system
that protects the rights of public
investors to vote their shares and fend
off attempts by corporate boards and
insiders to disenfranchise them and an
accounting and financial reporting
system that investors can trust.
Also important in the U.S. was the
growth of institutional investors in the
1990s.As these became more active,cor-
porate boards and management came
under increased scrutiny and, by the
1990s,were confronted with a set of cor-
Exhibit
Stock Returns Adjusted for Overall Market Performance with
Respect to Cash Flows Between the Firm and its Shareholders
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CASH FLOWING FROM SHAREHOLDERS TO 
THE COMPANY
Security sales
Common stock – 1.6
Preferred stock 0.1
Convertible preferred – 1.4
Convertible debt – 2.1
Straight debt – 0.2
Dividend decreases – 3.6
Investment decreases – 1.1
Source: Clifford W. Smith, Jr., 1986, “Raising Capital: Theory and Evidence,”
Midland Corporate Finance Journal, 4, pp. 6–22.porate governance guidelines such as those devel-
oped by the largest US institutional investor (TIAA-
CREF 2000).
TIAA-CREF (Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association – College Retirement Equity Fund) is
really quite blunt about its corporate governance
concerns. It says that “corporate governance initia-
tives – in which TIAA-CREF monitors the compa-
nies it invests in and presses for improved manage-
ment when appropriate – is an important aspect of
ensuring that the investments we make on behalf
of participants produce the highest possible
returns.”
And then came Enron,Tyco,WorldCom and a host
of other governance fiascos.What failed and why?
What Went Wrong?
Popular attention in these high profile debacles has
focused on the pay of senior management, espe-
cially pay-for-performance schemes connected to
stock options. Essentially, management sought
ways to inflate and aggressively manage and
manipulate revenues and earnings so as “to fool”
or mislead investors into driving up the company’s
stock price and make their stock options ever more
valuable. Additionally, balance sheets were man-
aged so as to keep debt off the books, again mis-
leading investors. For example, Citigroup and J.P.
Morgan lent Enron billions of dollars disguised as
energy trades on Enron’s balance sheet. But, how
could this happen in a world where companies
were audited and financial statements certified by
public accounting firms such as Arthur Andersen
so as to prevent just such an outcome from hap-
pening?
Well, the public accounting firms may have been
more interested in earning consulting fees from the
managers of the firms they were auditing and
retaining the company’s auditing business than in
representing the clients who, in theory, had hired
them – the shareholders.In 2001,for example,non-
audit fees comprised over fifty percent of the fees
paid to accounting firms by 28 of the 30 companies
making up the Dow Jones Industrial Average.2
And the directors? Where were the directors?
It turns out that directors are effectively appoint-
ed by corporate management, not by the share-
holders – even if they are the so-called indepen-
dent directors with no direct ties to the company.
Consequently, the directors often face their own
conflicts of interest with respect to keeping their
directorships and the benefits that go with them
and guarding the interests of the public share-
holders.
Tyco Corporation offers an example of a board
member receiving consulting fees as well as having
the company donate money to a selected charity.
Tyco International paid a total of $20 million to an
outside director and to a charity he controlled, in
return for his help in brokering a major acquisition
in 2001.3 Similar donations appear to have oc-
curred at Enron.4
What can be done to eliminate these abuses? 
The Board Of Directors
Clearly, independent directors must be indepen-
dent and they should be a majority of the board.
Past executives, consultants and individuals
beholden to current management for charitable
contributions and so forth are not independent.
As for the election of directors, reforms are need-
ed to make it much easier for shareholders to elect
directors other than those proposed and beholden
to management.One such reform would be to have
institutional investors nominate directors in addi-
tion to the management nominees.Also, much eas-
ier access to shareholders of record by competing
control groups would help by permitting the con-
testing groups to “campaign” for votes.
Other board reforms could include requiring inde-
pendent board members to meet separately from
inside members for evaluating corporate and man-
agerial performance,requiring the Board chairman
to be selected from the independent members or at
least prohibiting the CEO from also serving as the
Board chairperson and restricting the number of
boards on which a person can serve.










2 “Accounting Industry Fights Calls for ‘Audit Only’ Rules,” Wall
Street Journal, March 7, 2002, p. C1.
3 “Tyco Paid Director For Advisement on CIT Merger,” Monitor
Daily, January 29, 2002,
http://www.monitordily.com/story_page.cfm?News_id.
4 Janet Elliott, “UT dean’s Enron ties questioned,” Houston









Accounting And Financial Reporting
Many people would address the aggressive account-
ing and manipulation of earnings problem by simply
prohibiting the accounting firm that audits the com-
pany’s financial statements from also providing con-
sulting services to the company. Some institutional
investors have already moved in this direction with
regard to how they vote their shares.The California
Public Employees’ Retirement System (Calpers) has
announced it will vote against reappointing auditors
at companies where the auditors also provide con-
sulting services. And, recent legislation enacted in
the U.S. prohibits auditors from also selling certain
consulting services to their clients.
But, the most important task here is to restore the
integrity of the accounting profession and the con-
fidence investors have in the way financial state-
ments are prepared. The U.S. has moved in this
direction by establishing an independent govern-
ment board to oversee corporate audits. Still, more
than independent oversight is necessary.
A good place to start (in addition to getting rid of spe-
cial entity vehicles used to hide debt) is with report-
ing stock options as expenses.These options are com-
pensation and compensation is an expense; therefore
it should be recognized as such on the income state-
ment.The argument against expensing options is that
it would drive down the company’s stock price mak-
ing it more difficult to attract employees. In other
words, the argument against expensing options is that
companies need to fool investors into paying more for
the company than it is worth!
Maybe what is really needed is to jettison the current
U.S. accounting system, which relies extensively on
rules. Under this system, accountants and managers
are more likely to ask whether they are “breaking
the rules”rather than whether they are reporting the
true financial position of the company and comply-
ing with the spirit of the accounting standards. The
European system under the U.K based International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has far fewer
rules. Instead, the objective is to provide a true and
honest representation of the transaction.
Managerial Pay
One of the biggest scandals arising out of the
Enron fiasco is CEO pay. In theory, agency costs
can be reduced by tying managerial pay to perfor-
mance through stock options and bonuses depen-
dent on achieving certain financial goals such as
return on equity.But,it now appears that managers
were manipulating financial statements so as to
drive up stock prices and cash in on the bonuses
and options. Furthermore, CEOs of now bankrupt
companies walked away with millions of dollars
while the companies were going under and
employees were losing their jobs.5 How did these
and other managers manage to get these pay pack-
ages? 
Once again we are back to the cozy relationship
that exists between senior managers and their
boards, because the boards must approve these
packages. And, we are also back to the lack of
transparency regarding managerial pay. Without
considerable effort, it is nearly impossible to figure
out the “true” compensation of an executive from
forms filed with the SEC.
What is the answer? Tying compensation more
closely to the performance of the company relative
to other firms in its industry and the overall stock
market would help. Another solution would be to
have the shareholders vote on the pay for senior
managers.
New legislation in the U.S.has addressed the “pay”
issue by banning personal loans to the top execu-
tives of public companies and by requiring share-
holder approval of option plans.But more needs to
be done, especially with regard to the transparency
question and letting shareholders vote on overall
compensation plans.
Where Are We Going?
In 1776, Adam Smith had the following to say
about public corporations, then called joint-stock
companies (Smith 1776):
“The directors of such [joint stock] companies,
however, being the managers of other people’s
money than their own, it cannot well be expected,
that they should watch over it with the same anx-
ious vigilance with which the partners in a private
copartnery frequently watch over their own. ...
5 Ian Cheng, “Survivors Who Laughed All the Way to the Bank,”
Financial Times, July 30, 2002.Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always
prevail, more or less, in the management of the
affairs of such a company.”
Today, it looks like Smith was prescient. The
Board of Directors of many U.S corporations
have failed to carry out the spirit of their “duty of
care” to the public shareholders. Instead, they let
management, and some would say assisted it in
the act,extract wealth from the public by manipu-
lating earnings, awarding themselves excessive
compensation and engaging in dubious schemes
to hide the deteriorating financial performance of
their companies.
In other words, we are still muddling our way
through the morass of how to ensure that man-
agers of publicly held corporations (where man-
agement is separated from owners) don’t misuse
scarce resources or line their own pockets at the
expense of the other stakeholders of the firm. The
lesson of the current “crisis” is that public share-
holders need to be better empowered to control
managers and to hold accountable the directors of
public corporations. For such empowerment to
occur, major accounting reforms are needed along
with governance changes designed to protect the
individual (small) investor. Without such changes,
we are likely to see an exit of the small investor
and an increased concentration of ownership of
corporations as the solution to holding manage-
ment accountable,a governance arrangement com-
monly found in countries with weak investor pro-
tection laws.We are also likely to see an increase in
the cost of equity capital leading to a reduction in
investment and the overall performance of the
economy.
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